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will not give a cloudy precipitate when tested with a 
solution of silver nitrate. 
If the washed emulsion has increased much in bulk 
while in the muslin bag, squeeze it as much as llossiule 
and allow it to drain in the empty boiler for some 
hours, with an occasional squeeze. Alcohol may also 
be used to get rid of the extra water absorbed by the 
emulsion. By covering with alcohol, it soon decreases 
in bulk, and a couple of washes in water leave it in a 
condition to be melted and coated on the plates. 
If, in coating the plates, the emulsion does not flow 
readily, the addition of 5 per cent of its volume of 
alcohol will overcome the trouble. In the case where 
alcohol has been used to reduce the volume of the 
washed emulsion, further addition of alcohol may not 
be ilecessary. 
It is scarcely necessary to say that all the various 
steps of making the emulsion and coating the plates 
must be conducted in the dark room, and even the red 
light must be kept as faint as possible for fear that 
the work may be injuriously affected. Care must be 
taken to have all the vessels and implements employed 
scrupulously clean, which injunction, of course, ap­
plies also to the glass plates on which the emulsion is 
spread. To render them chemically clean it is recom­
mended to immerse them flrst in l'itric acid, then rub 
with a strong' solution of caustic soda in alcohol and 
rinse in pure water. 
It is necessary in carrying out any process for mak­
ing the emulsion to use distilled water, as the ordinary 
article is liable to contain substances which interfere 
with the reactions which must be brought about. Gel­
atin is sometimes contaminated with sulphurous acid, 
which renders it unfit for photographic use. 
Some years ago we copied from a photographic 
journal an emulsion process which involved the forma­
tion of silver carbonate; we afterward concluded from 
a consideration of disastrous explosions of indelible 
ink in which silver nitrate and an alkaline carbonate 
were present, that it would be best to avoid the process 
last referred to; the explosions referred to have not 
been explained, and it seems within possibility that 
formation of silver carbonate under certain conditions 
may lead to its explosive decomposition. The result 
aimed at can be accomplished without either car­
bonates or ammonia, as shown above; and it is safest 
to follow methods in which they are not required.­
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RECENT SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THE 
FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE'. 
By MR. WILLIAM LAIRD CLOWES. 
AT a time like the present, which is one of ex­
tremely rapid scientific progress, it is especially in­
cumbent upon us not to neglect, even for a single un­
necessary day, any device which may possibl� enable 
us, either in peace or in war, to defeat our rivals by 
honorable means. Scientific discovery tends ever more 
and more to obliterate the significance of those physi­
cal and moral differences which anciently rendered one 
race superior to another; and brain and thought are 
alrEady more potent factors in the world than mere 
muscle and animal courage. Moreover, we know from 
experience that to-day or to-morrow may produce a 
complete revolution of method in almost any of our 
processes. We ought, therefore, never to sleep, save, 
as it were, with our ears and eyes open. Yet, strange 
to say, the amount of practical attention which we 
give to new machinery and appliances is often, I am 
aofraid, inversely proportionate to the novelty and in­
gEnuity of the device in question. We are too prone, 
when examining new inventions, to admire the clever­
ness displayed in them, and then to reject them, 
wholly and finally, for one of two reasons, both of 
which are in reality quite inadequate. 
One reason frequently alleged is that the invention 
haE' yet to be brought to absolute perfection, and that, 
pending its complete evolution, we may safely neglect 
it. The other reason is that the machinery or appar­
atus is too delicate or complicated for use b:\! the class 
of workmen who are accustomed to handle the appli­
ances which the new apparatus would supersede. The 
evils resulting from such an attitude, which is charac­
teristically a national one, are twofold. On the one 
hand we snub and starve the inventor, and possibly 
drive' him elsewhere in disgust; on the other, we make 
the far more dangerous mistake of assuming that the 
tide of technical education will not rise elsewhere so 
long as we choose to batten it down in our own little 
hold. What we ought to do is, surely, in the one case 
to take up promising inventions, and turning them 
over for development to the brightest intellects at our 
command, to enjoy the exclusive profits of them as 
soon as they shall be pract�ally perfect; and, in the 
other, to educate our men up to the point of being able 
to use delicate and complicated appliances, instead of 
rejecting the appliances because our existing men are 
incapable of handling them. It is absurd for us to say, 
as in practice we do, "Don't offer us any unfamiliar nov­
elty that isn't approximately perfecte.d; and, above all, 'don't offer us any pe-rfected novelty that isn't approxi­
mately familiar." While we continue to follow that 
policy we run the risk ofofalling out of station with the 
rest of the world, and of not discovering our error of 
position until too late. 
It is mainly with the object of appealing [or readier 
official interest in certain recent inventions, and for a 
greater official anxiety to educate the workman up to 
the level of the tools already available, or about to be­
come available, to his hand, that I venture to address 
you on "Some Recent Scientific Developments and the 
Future of Naval Warfare." These developments must 
inevitably influence naval warfare strategically as well 
as tactically, and it is hard to say in which direction 
the effects are likely to be more important. 
Within the compass of little more than a lifetime the 
practice of naval strategy has already been revolution­
ized by the introduction of steam and the electric teleg­
raph. The principle of strategy, however, has suffered 
no change. It is very simple, and it may still, as in the 
days of Nelson, be thus formulated: To have at the 
right spot, and at the right moment, a fighting force 
superior in personnel, as well as in matCriel, to the 
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force of the enemy at the same time and place. But 
the practice is still changing rapidly, and, under the 
influence of recent invention, it must change still more. 
We have not yet realized to the full the strategical 
value of speed' as a factor in the successful carrying 
out of the fundamental object of strategy. Speed, in 
the present, is all that, and more than, the weather 
gage was in the past; and, if we neglect it, we shall 
cripple the hands of our admirals, no matter how 
many ships and men we may place at their disposal. 
It is the soul of all effective combination for offense; 
and I am not sure that it is not equally valuable as a 
means of defense against certain weapons which at 
present cannot easily be otherwise avoided-to-wi
.
t, 
subinarines. The submarine, of which more anon, IS 
essentially a slow craft, whether she travel on the sur­
face or below it. A large ship' can have no more secure 
protection against the submarine than the fact that 
she is in very rapid motion. A submarine must come 
to the surface to look about her; and if her big enemy 
be seen to be changing position rapidly, the submarine 
can gather little information that is likely to be of use 
to her. 
And here I should like to say that our own prepara­
tions for attacking submarines with spar torpedoes" 
fitted to torpedo boats or destroyers, are exciting tha 
ridicule of those foreign nations which, from experi­
ence with them, know what submarines are like. We 
claim that our specially rigged spar torpedo can reach 
a submarine at a depth of 10 feet below the surface. 
Commander W. W. Kimball, U. S. N., says' very justly, 
"Why a submarine should run at 10 feet instead of 30 
feet or 40 feet does not appear; nor does it appear how 
the destroyer could, when the submarine showed :for a 
few seconds, head for her, and strike her with the spar 
torpedo before she attained a safe depth. While the 
battleship, protected by the destroyer, is the proper 
quarry of the submarine, there seems to be no law 
against sinking the destroyer in passing, if her pres­
ence were inconvenient." The truth seems to be that, 
if the submarine can be reached at all by the spar tor­
pedo, she can-at least in the vast majority of cases­
be reached much more expeditiously and certainly by 
means of the gun; though it may be desirable to mount 
guns in a special manner in order to deal with her. 
The offensive usefulness of speed has, I believe, been 
doubled or trebled by recent improvements in wireless 
telegraphy'. It looks as if every ship, large or small, 
in future naval warfare might be, as it were, the 
mobile terminus of an unlimited number of aerial 
cables communicating not only with the base on shore, 
but also with all friendly ships within a radius of 
several hundreds of miles. 
It is true that last year, when wireless telegraphy 
was employed by one side during the naval 
maneuvers the system broke dOWIl, for the reason that 
the rival commander was able to tap the messages, and 
did not use wireless telegraphy himself. But the 
breakdown on that 'occasion was due entirely to the 
manner in which wireless telegraphy was misused. 
The defeated commander might either have employed 
a code' for the sending of his messages, or have used 
some variety of wireless telegraphy which was not 
tapable. It is merely a question, on the one hand, of a 
special cipher, or, on the other, of special disch�rge 
terminals, coherers, and relays·. The possible variety 
is infinite; and it is hardly conceivable that in war 
time the cipher of one side should be known to the 
other, or that both sides should use exactly similar in­
struments, similarly "attuned." 
Given a good and untapable system of wireless teleg­
raphy, utilizable over long distances at sea, naval 
strategy, barring accidents, must rapidly become al­
most an exact science. But it is desirable to have in 
reserve some alternative to the lofty spars which at 
present seem to be favored by Mr. Marconi. They can­
not be carried by any vessel in very heavy weather; 
and they cannot be carried by a small craft, such as a 
torpedo boat or a steam launch, in any weather. It 
ought to be possible to substitute for them, when neces­
sary, kites', such as, I believe, were successfully used 
by Gen. Baden-Powell at Mafeking. These have much 
greater radial "command" than can be given to spars 
on board ship, and they can be flown by craft of a ll 
sizes. Electrical kite-fiying, and wireless telegraphy 
by that means, should be part of the ordinary routine 
of every ship of war. Nor must it be forgotten that 
there is yet much to be learned with regard to kites, 
especially kites large enough to carry with them a 
small motor controllable from below. 
We have seen in South Africa that, assuming good 
intelligence to be at the disposal of a belligerent, the 
essence of effective practical strategy is extreme mo­
bility--€xtreme speed, that is. I rejoice, therefore, 
though it is perhaps hardly even a straw to show 
which way the wind blows, that the admiralty has 
decided to continue its experiments with turbine pro­
pellers in destroyers, and also to apply �he turbine 
principles to propulsion to one comparatively . large vessel, a third-class cruiser. I trust, too, that Whitehall 
has already devoted its attention to Mr. J. T. Mar­
shall's new valve gear, for there can be no doubt that 
we must witness, within the next few years, an 
enormous increase in the speed of large fighting ships; 
and, then, woe betide the power which lags behind its 
rivals in the matter of rapid mobility. It will see it­
self condemned to forego strategy altogether in its 
naval combinations-in other words, it will find itself 
confined to the local defensive. 
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As regards tactical factors, what I have said as to 
our habitual attitude to new inventions applies more 
perhaps to them than to strategical factors. Take, for 
example, the question of range-finding" in action at 
sea. I was once in one of his majesty's ships in which 
a set of range-finding instruments was fitted experi­
mentally. The appliances were rejected without under­
,going a really fair trial. They were tried superficially 
by people who knew next to nothing about them; a�d 
they were condemned, not, so far as I could ascertaIn, 
because they were ineffective, but because they w�re 
complicated, and could not, of course, be worked eaSily 
by the untrained intelligence which was available to 
handle them. Surely it would have been better to 
adopt the invention, which had been well tried abroad, 
or some superior one, and to train the necessary in­
telligence. 
In the meantime, how does our navy hope to find the 
range in action? It depends mainly upon being able to 
note the drop of tentative shots". Where two single 
ships are engaged, this method, though slow and un­
scientific, may possibly work; but when whole flee
.
ts 
are engaged, how can any human eye feel certal,n whence comes the particular shot the drop of which IS 
noted? At Santiago it was found to be impossible to 
form any correct conclusions in that way. Now there 
are many excellent and almost perfect range-finders. 
I will mention only the Barr and Stroud, which is said 
to be responsible for the recent excellent shooting of 
the "Terrible"," and the Zeiss stereoscopic", each of 
which reduces the poS'sibility of error to a minimum, 
though there are others almost equally as good. For 
years we have been flirting with such inventions; for 
years we have refrained from taking them to our arms, 
beeause of our fear that we do not sufficiently under­
stand them. They ought to have been long ago in all 
our fighting ships. By this time we should have 
learned to understand them. Other nations have 
adopted them. What will happen if we 'fall into a con­
flict with one of those other nations? 
Naval gunnery will also be greatly improved so so�n 
as two or three comparatively small problems which 
are now awaiting solution shall have been solved. 
Their solution ought not to be long delayed, if only the 
right kind of intellects can be persuaded to turn .their attention to them. The great want of the day IS, of 
course, an arrangement whereby it shall be possible to 
fire a projectile through moderately thick modern 
armor, and to burst it immediately in rear'". Another 
great want is some new method of igniting smokeless 
powders'''. .These powders, especially when fired in 
relatively small guns, are, as their name implies, prac­
tically smokeless. But at present the most convenient 
method of igniting them is found to be through the 
medium of an ignition charge of black powder of the 
old smoky kind. In small weapons the ignition charge, 
and the quantity of smoke produced by it, are insigni­
ficant; but in the case of heavy guns the ignition 
charge alone comprises about as much black powder 
as formerly would have sufficed for a couple of full 
charges for the old 64-pounder muzzle-loader; and, the 
volume of smoke thus produced being very consider­
able, the advantages of employing smokeless powder 
are to a large extent neutralized. 
A very noteworthy development of recent science, 
and one that cannot fail greatly to influence the tactics 
of future naval warfare, is the modern submarine". I 
am not a submarine enthusiast; but it i s  impossible 
not to recognize that the extension of the open field of 
naval operations from a space of two dimensions only 
to one of three is too significant to be lightly regarded. 
The best existing submarine is very slow, very blind, 
of limited radius of action, and very liable to accident; 
but it is vain utterly to deny the value-especially the 
moral value-of a craft which, without leaving your 
immediate vicinity, can move altogether out of your 
sphere of activity, and still, perhaps, deal you a fatal 
injury. It seems to me that the cubmarine, even if it 
be carried no further than at present, means the doom 
of the old-fashioned blockade. 
But I am sure that the submarine will be carried 
very much further than at present, and that already 
we may see traced out before us the lines along which 
it is destined to develop. 
The weakest points of the best existing submarines 
are: That they cannot see clearly unless they come to 
the surface to do so; that they cannot be sure of main­
taining a given course under water, even by utilizing 
the Obry apparatus"; and that the lives of the crews 
within them are exposed, especially in war time, to 
extreme risks. . 
During the past three or four years nu�erous I�­
genious inventors have turned their attentIOn to thiS 
subject16 with a view to producing a vessel which shall 
be capable of moving at considerable speed beneath 
the surface of the water; which shall not need a human 
crew; which shall not want to see whither it is boun.d; 
which shall be controllable at every moment of ItS 
course; shall not expose those who work it to extra-
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ordinary risks; and which shall be manageable from a 
distance without the intervention of wires or other 
visible connections. It is sought, in a word, to com­
bine the useful features of the existing submarine, of 
the automobile torpedo, of the electrical countermining 
launch, and of the Brennan torpedo; dispensing, at the 
same time, with material ties between the operator' 
mId the weapon, and securing a range, which, though 
less than that of the submarine, shall be far greater 
than that of the countermining launch, the Whitehead, 
or the Brennan. Some scores of patents bearing upon 
these projects have been issued to Messrs. Axel Orling 
and James Tarbotton Armstrong", Arthur A. Govan, 
Cecil Varicas", and Bradley A. Fiske, the last-qamed 
being the well-known American naval officer W110 is 
famous in connection with more than one range-finder, 
and with other inventions designed to infiuence the fu­
ture of naval warfare. 
These gentlemen utilize various forms of energy in 
various ways; and it is impossible here to go into de­
tails of their inventions. It must suffice to say that, 
although no perfect form of vessel controllable by 
wireless currents-a form to which I have ventured to 
give the generic name of "Actinaut"'-has yet been pro­
duced, more than enough has been accomplished to 
demonstrate that what it is sought to effect can be 
effected and will be effected in the near future. In­
deed, if it were possible to induce these rival inventors 
to combine and co-operate, and if it were possible to 
place at their disposal the knowledge and experience 
of half a dozen men such as Lord Kelvin, Sit" Hiram 
Maxim, Mr. Brennan, and Mr. Marconi, I verily believe 
that you might have the perfected engine before you 
on this day next year. When that perfected engine is 
produced it cannot fail to work something like a revo­
lution in naval warfare. 
All these considerations bring me back again to one 
of the points from which I started. Our best available 
tools are rapidly getting beyond the effective control 
of our best available men, and the real lesson of the 
situation undoubtedly is that if we would properly 
utilize all the resources which science has placed, and 
will presently place, at our disposal for the prosecution 
of naval warfare, we must greatly improve the scienti­
fic standard of the personnel. 
It is significant that Lord Charles Beresford, with­
out committing himself to any expression of opinion 
as to the merits of certain types of water-tube boilers, 
has hinted his belief that many of the breakdowllf� 
of those boilers may possibly be attributable, not so 
much to defects inherent in the boilers, as to the in· 
competency of the working staff, an incompetency due 
to lack of training and e�perience, and perhaps also to 
short-handedness. 
The present Board of Admiralty is admittedly 
anxious to make the naval service all that it should 
be; nor does it resent friendly criticism. I would 
therefore ask their lordships to refiect whether the 
present methods of dealing with the scientific prob­
lems and daily work of the royal navy can possibly 
produce satisfactory result�. 
There are two categories of scientific officers in the 
service-the engineers proper, and the specialist execu· 
tive officers. The engIneers are men with a relatively 
long, broad, and deep 8cientific and technical training. 
They are an expensive class, and at present the navy 
has confessedly failed to attract and retain the best 
specimens of the class. 
The specialist executive officers are, so Mr. C. M. 
Johnson, R. N., has irreverently said'", "Men who 
dabble in electricity, fiddle about with files and ham­
mers, set up amateur lathes in their cabins, and 
imagine that they are making engineers of themselves." 
I do not associate myself with this description of a 
class of officers who, no matter what else may be said 
of them, are remarkably keen, and do their work 
astonishingly well, so far as the conditions permit. 
But the conditions do not permit much. A torpedo­
lieutenant generally gets about seventeen months of 
technical training in the course of his career. This is, 
naturally, not enough to make il well-equipped electrical 
engineer of even the most brilliant of men, still lel'l!! 
is it enough to make of him a mechanical and hydraulic 
engineer as well. 
Nevertheless, with a view, I suppose, to economizing 
expenses, and to restricting the total number of com­
missioned officers carried, the Admiralty has intrusted 
a great many purely engineering duties to specialist 
executives, and in addition, has turned over the entire 
control of the engineering department in small ships 
to a warrant officer-an artificer engineer. Not only 
i� this officer of necessity a man of limited education 
and experience, but also he is now a man less ex­
perienced than his fellows formerly were; for a lower­
ing of the standard of qualification has recently been 
sanctioned. 
In the meantime, to assist the specialist executives, a 
class of ratings known as electrical fitters has been 
lately called into being. This is composed of men who 
have very little electrical knowledge at all. 
And so we see that whereas at one time all the en­
gineering business of the ship was in the hands of 
properly qualified engineer officers, much of it is now 
intrusted to specialist executives, much to warrant 
officers, and some to people admittedly possessed of 
hardly any scientific training at all. 
While, in short, the materiel has been improving 
yearly, the personnel has been assuming more and 
more the character of a penny-wise-pound-foolish make­
shift. This state of affairs must, I think, be remedied 
if we would profit fully by recent scientific develop­
ments. The brightest scientific intelligences ought to 
be attracted to the navy, and to be retained there when 
once they have been engaged; and I see no reason why 
they should not be. We are now paying 5s. a day in 
South Africa to soldiers-men whose necessary quali­
fications are little higher than those of unskilled labor­
ers. It can hardly be doubted that a first-rate naval 
engineer officer, even if you have to pay him a thousand 
a year, is a much cheaper article than an Imperial 
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Yeoman at £91 5s. Mor!!over, while you can pick up 
the latter at any time, you can secure the former only 
if you engage and train him at a time when, as at 
present, you are sorely tempted to do without him, 
and intrust his work to an amateur. 
TORPEDO BOAT DESTROYERS.* 
By S. W. BAR:-IAllY. 
So much attention has been drawn to the destroyer 
class of the British navy during the past year, that no 
excuse is needed for a short paper on the subject. It 
will necessarily be short, because no full treatment 
of the question is possible, in view of the fact that a 
committee is now sitting at the Admiralty, and is in­
vestigating all the cases in which defects due to weak­
ness of construction are reported to have developed 
during service at sea. I shall not therefore attempt 
to discuss these cases, because the facts have not been 
authoritatively made known. Neither do I wish to ex­
press an opinion as to the loss of the "Cobra." I will 
only say that, although she was an exceptional and 
experimental vessel, still, if we are to believe that no 
injury to the bottom preceded the accident, it must be 
considered surprising that no preliminary straining or 
laboring of the joints gave warning of danger. We 
have no experience of mild steel, of the high quality 
to which we have become accustomed, having failed 
suddenly, even under repeated applications of stresses 
well within the elastic limit of the material; but as to 
what really happened, the evidence, to my mind, is 
not at all conclusive. 
The problem which was originally set the destroyer 
builders was to produce a small vessel which would be 
faster than a torpedo boat and would carry a heavier 
armament. Those were the sale conditions imposed. 
Messrs. Yarrow and ourselves, who made the first de­
signs, naturally worked on the lines of the torpedo 
boats which wa had been building for years. Speaking 
·for ourselves, we had confidence, from our experience 
with these boats, that if destroyers were developed on 
the same lines they would be at least as seaworthy as 
torpedo boats, if not more so. We had built over 200, 
some of which had made voyages in all weathers and 
to all parts of the world, and not one had been lost at 
sea through insufficient strength. We considered that 
they must be amply strong to live through any weather 
in which they might be caught, but that the officers and 
men might reasonably be asked to submit to the same 
amount of discomfort at sea as was borne by the crews 
of torpedo boats, seeing that they were designed for 
the special purpose of catching these boats. 
The torpedo gunboat of 800 or 1,000 tons is proba1)ly 
the smallest vessel in which any degree of comfort for 
the crew can be secured when it is necessary to remain 
constantly at sea; but although the .torpedo gunboats 
may be able to overhaul torpedo boats in rough weather 
because of their size, a class was wanted which would 
overtake them in any weather, and I think this want 
has been met by the present destroyers. So far as 
I know, this condition of discomfort has been cheer­
fully accepted by the navy, and the important question 
i3, Can these small vessels of high speed be made rea­
sonably safe at sea? I think there is no doubt that 
they can. The strains coming upon a ship among 
waves are not exactly, or even approximately, calcul­
able. The effect of the inertia forces produced by the 
rapid motion of the ends of the vessel as she pitches 
and scends cllnnot be estimated, because the velocity 
of the motion of the parts is not determinable. It is 
not necessary to enumerate the complex forces produced 
by the motion in a sea way; it is sufficiently evident that 
the data for exact calculation are altogether wanting. 
Then, again, while at one moment the deck of the 
vessel forms the top of the girder and the keel the bot­
tom, at the next moment the rolling of the vessel may 
make the corner of the deck take the place of the top, 
and the opposite bilge that of the bottom of the girder. 
All that is possible to do is to establish a scale of 
comparison by which we may judge of the safety of one 
vessel by comparing her with another which has shown 
no sign of distress during the time that she has been 
at sea, and even then it is always possible that excep­
tional circumstances may occur which may cause us 
to modify from time to time our standard of compari­
son. 
It is usual to suppose that by considering the vessel 
first as poised upon the summit of a wave of her own 
length, and then as lying between the crests of a pair of 
such waves, and reducing the hull to the form of an 
equivalent girder, that a method of comparing the 
stresses to which ships are subjected at sea is possible. 
The vessel may never be in such a condition, probably 
never is, and if she were, the stresses would doubtless 
be different from what they are calculated to be; but 
in default of a better way of ascertaining if a given 
ship stands at least as good a chance of safety at sea 
as some other ship which is proved to be satisfactory, 
the test is a valuable one. It is usual to assume the 
height of the wave for vessels of this size as about 
one-twentieth of the length, and some idea of the se­
verity of the supposed conditions may be obtained when 
it is stated that it means that a 210 foot destroyer is 
immersed to the gunwale at the two ends, and that 
only about 2% ,feet of the depth of the hull amidships 
is in the water when she is lying in the trough; and 
that when poised on the crest, about 34 feet of each 
extremity of the ship is out of the water altogether. 
It is, of cour,e. of great importance that the deck 
flhould not only be sufficiently strong to avoid buckling 
locally under compressive st-rains. but that the form 
of the deck. as a whole, should be rigidly maintained. 
In the long machinery compartment, where there are 
no bulkheads, either transverse or longitudinal, great 
care needs to be taken that the deck beams and longi­
tudinal deck girders are sufficiently strong for the 
purpose. In some of the latest destroyers built abroad. 
where the engines are placed between the boilers, the 
coal bunker bulkheads are continuous through the en­
gine room, and greatly add to the strength amidships, 
but this arrangement obliges the engines to be placed 
one in front of the other, since there is not sumcient 
width for them to be abreast. This so greatly adds 
to the length of the ship, and consequently to the bend-
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ing moment, that it is, to my mind, a doubtful ad· 
vantage. The longitudinals and deep beams over these 
spaces will no doubt be reinforced in boats in which 
any tendency to bending has been observed. I think 
that they might with advantage be 'further supported 
by pillars, in order to strengthen the deck to withstand 
the compression to which it is subjected under a sag­
ging moment. Our practice has been to make the deck 
perfectly straight for the greater part of the length 
of the ship, giving no sheer except at the bow. Any 
sheer amidships prevents the deck from taking its 
proper share of the tension coming upon the upper 
works under hogging moments, and throws undue 
stress upon the sheer strake. 
One of the most important factors determining the 
strength or weakness of a destroyer-more important, 
in my opinion, than the thickness of the plating-is 
the ratio of depth to length. In the "Albatross," which 
is the longest we have built. there are 1514 depths in 
the length; but in some of the class, I believe, the 
depth is much less in proportion. Two destroyers 
may have the same scantlings of plates and frames, 
and be alike in length and displacement, and yet one 
'may be' a weak ship and the other a perfectly . sound 
one; and especially may this be true if there is a great 
disproportion in relative depth. 
As regards details, to which we attach great im­
portance, I will only mention one or two. Unless the 
greatest care is taken i,., l<>ve1ing the shell and deck 
plating by hand upon the slab, parts at the plate wiIi 
te more severely strained than other parts, and the 
strength of the whole plate will thereby be reduced; 
but this is an operation requiring great skill and taking 
much time. No amount of machine rolling will level 
these plates as they require to be leveled if the full 
advantage is to be taken of every pound of the material. 
Joggling the butts of deck platings is, in my opinion, 
an undesirable practice, especially when this is of higb 
tensile steel. I think it not only injures the plates to 
treat them in this way, but it also prevents the full 
tensile strength of the plate from coming into play. 
A joggled stringer butt, for instance, is subjected to an 
unfair pull, which has to straighten the kink in the 
plate before it can stretch it, and an excessive strain il:: 
thrown on the sheer strake. 
'l'he riveting is another detail requi ring the greatcs�; 
care, and we never allow this to be done by piecework. 
The introduction of high tensile steel has made the 
question of riveting of still greater importance. • he 
value of this material would be much enhanced if rivets 
of the same strangth could be employed; but there are 
difficulties attending its use, and not much experience 
has been gained with hard steel rivets up to the pres­
ent. If rivets, either of mild or hard steel, are riveted 
cold, they appear to become brittle and treacherous, 
and our experience has satisfied us that good Lowmoor 
or charcoal iron rivets are more reliable, and as strong 
as steel rivets when put in cold. Rivets of small diam­
eter cannot, we believe, be safely put in hot, whether 
they are iron or steel, because they are liable to waste 
by scaling in heating, and are cooled so rapidly on 
being put into the holes that there is not time to prop­
erly knock them up before they arrive at a temperature 
at which hammering is injurious to steel. We there· 
fore prefer iron rivets for sizes up to % inch or 7-16 
inch, but those of % inch or upward might be of steel. 
and should be worked hot. It may be possible to USf) 
high tensile steel for these, if it is certain that its 
quality is not affected by the heating, on which point 
more experiments are desirable. The spacing of these 
rivets could be greater than with iron rivets, and the 
plate would be stronger at the joint. 
The ratio of weight of structural hull to total dis­
placement in destroyers is not unduly light, and does 
not compare unfavorably with that found in other 
classes of warships. For example, Sir William White. 
in his "Manual of Naval Architecture," gives the 
weight of material contributing to structural strength 
in a steel-built first-class battleship of the present day 
as 18 per cent of the total displacement, and for a 
typical swift protected cruiser of high speed, large 
coal supply and heavily armed, as 20% per cent of the 
total displacement. This is considerably less than 
the percentage of weight of material contributing to 
structural strength in torpedo boats and torpedo-boat 
destroyers. Although the Thornycroft destroyers are 
not longer in proportion to depth than the earlier tor­
pedo boats, we have taken more care to preserve the 
continuity of longitudinal strength than was done in 
those boats. Continuous keelsons, side stringers, and 
deck stringers have been introduced which were not 
fitted in the torpedo boats, and far more attention i s  
now paid to the fitting o f  doubling plates i n  way of 
openings in the deck, such as funnels, fan cowls, hatch­
ways, etc., in order to C'ompensate for the material cut 
away by these openings, and thus to bring the strength 
there up to that of a normal seC'tion taken through the 
rivet hole.;; at a frame, which Rhould be the weakest sec­
tion in the ship. To this question of compensation 
the Admiralty have very properly attached great im­
portance in all their recent specifications, and there is 
no doubt that it is much more necessary to pay care­
ful attention to it than it was in torpedo boats, on ac­
count of the increase in dimensions. 
The longitudinal bending moments for similar shipR 
on similar waves vary as the fourth power of the linear 
dimensions, so that the stress per square inch of ma­
terial will increase with increase of dimensions 
if weight of hull vary as displacement, and 
as a rule this is found to be the case. Large 
ships are usually more highly stressed than 
small ones. M. Normand and others have shown 
that structural weights should vary as the four-thirds 
power of the displacement for equal stresses under 
longitudinal bending in similar vessels. But in deal­
ing with moderate increa!les of dimensions, as in pass· 
ing from a torpedo boat to a destroyer, there are a 
good many of the scantlings, such as plating over pro­
pellers, doublings and' chafing plates in way of anchors, 
coal bunker bulkheads and shoveling fiats, and other 
parts which do not count for much in structural 
strength, but which require to be of a certain mint­
mum thickness for local strength in the smaller vessel, 
and which do not need to be increased in the same pro­
portion as the rest. The weight thus economized can 
be utilized in thickening the deck, keel, and sheer 
